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STUDENT NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS OF
LAW-CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND
PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES
Prejudgment remedies have long provided great leverage to
the creditor in satisfying his claims. Statutory distress for rent,
prejudgment garnishment of wages, repossession and disposition of
collateral by a secured party, and other similar "provisional legal
or equitable processes"' are usually enforced without the debtor
receiving notice and a hearing. The absence of notice and a hearing
conflicts directly with the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. The very nature of procedural due process is that parties
whose rights are affected are entitled to be heard, and, in order
that they may enjoy that right, they must be notified. This conflict
of prejudgment remedies with constitutional principles has been
the basis for various decisions in recent years which may invalidate
innumerable statutory schemes involving prejudgment remedies.
American society is becoming increasingly dependent on the
use of consumer credit in its daily activities. The advent of univer-
sally accepted credit cards has enabled many Americans to elevate
their living standards by the use of "buy now-pay later" plans.
This is evidenced by the fact that at the end of March, 1972, more
than $55.2 billion in consumer credit was outstanding in this coun-
try.2 Thus, the changes in creditor's rights brought about by the
conflict between prejudgment remedies and constitutional due
process guarantees will substantially affect the American con-
sumer.
'The term "provisional legal or equitable process" was coined by Professor
William D. Hawkland of the University of Illinois School of Law in his "Model
Notice and Hearing for Provisional Remedies Act." This term, which will be dis-
cussed more fully under Section IV infra, refers to remedies prior to final judgment
that enable a creditor to restrain the person or property of a debtor. The term
encompasses such remedies as attachment, garnishment, replevin, creditor's bill,
trustee process, summary proceedings for repossession of property, extra-judicial
mortgage foreclosure, injunctions, and body attachment.
2R. Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession, An Economic Analysis (unpub-
lished article, submitted with amicus curiae briefs to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals for consideration in the appeal of Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.
Cal. 1972)).
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I. RECENT CASE LAW ATrACKING PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES
Scrutiny of prejudgment remedies in the light of procedural
due process is a result of the 1969 decision in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corporation.3 In Sniadach, a Wisconsin finance company,
in accordance with the Wisconsin garnishment law, froze the wages
of a debtor pending disposition of a suit in which the company
claimed $420 due on a promissory note. The United States Su-
preme Court held that the Wisconsin wage garnishment procedure
constituted a taking of property without prior notice and hearing
in violation of procedural due process guarantees. Sniadach repre-
sented the first time procedural due process was used by the Court
to strike down a state statute which permitted the deprivation of
the use of one's property without a hearing, even though the depri-
vation was temporary and a subsequent hearing was guaranteed. 4
Sniadach, however, was not without its limitations. The Su-
preme Court merely proscribed summary procedures invoked
against specialized types of property-in that case wages. In addi-
tion, the Court suggested that summary proceedings may be con-
stitutional in extraordinary situations5 where the state has a spe-
cial interest,6 provided the statute is narrowly drawn to meet the
situation.
Following the rationale of Sniadach, subsequent decisions
have expanded the concept of "specialized type of property" to
invalidate various state summary procedures on due process
grounds.7 One of the most significant of these decisions is Fuentes
3395 U.S. 337 (1969), commented on in 72 W. VA. L. REv. 165 (1970).
'THE SUPREME COURT, 1968 TERM, 83 HARv. L. REv. 113 (1970).
*Extraordinary situations have been held to exist where summary procedures
are used against an individual or an organization in the public interest. Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of mislabeled vitamin
products); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (federal conservator sent in to
straighten out private savings and loan); Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (adopt-
ing wartime price controls); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (state bank
shareholders attacking illegal execution); N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211
U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of unfit food); Coach v. State, 165 So. 2d 426 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1964) (revokingM.D.'s surgical privileges for the safety of patient). For
further discussion, see 73 W. VA. L. Rxv. 80, 85-86 (1971); 72 W. VA. L. REv. 165,
166 (1970).
GBoddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ("the compelling interest test").
7Goldberg v. Kelly 397 U.S. 254 (1970), commented on in 73 W. VA. L. REV.
165 (1971), used this reasoning to determine that a state may not terminate welfare
assistance without first providing notice and a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.
In Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), seizure
2
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v. Shevin.5 The appellant purchased various household goods
under a conditional sales contract calling for monthly payments.
Under the contract, the seller retained title while the purchaser
was entitled to possession unless and until the occurrence of de-
fault on the installments. A disagreement arose regarding servicing
the goods, and the purchaser refused to remit further installments.
The seller claimed default and obtained a writ of replevin under
the Florida statutory procedure.9 Under this ex parte procedure the
purchaser's goods were seized without notice and hearing. The
Supreme Court declared the Florida replevin procedure unconsti-
tutional. The Court held that Mrs. Fuentes was deprived of her
property without due process of law, because she was denied an
opportunity to be heard before her property was taken from her
possession. In Fuentes the mere fact that the right of continued
possession was disputed was held sufficient to require the seller of
goods to show, at the very least, that the buyer had defaulted in
his payments.
The principles of Sniadach and Fuentes provided the impetus
without notice of a debtor's property pursuant to a state replevin statute was held
unconstitutional even though the creditor was required to post bond and the debtor
could have prevented the seizure by showing a meritorious defense.
A virtual deluge of cases has evolved from these same principles. Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (state prejudgment replevin statutes); Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver's license); Cal. Dep't of Human Resources
Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971) (withholding of unemployment compensation
benefits pending appeal by employer); Wis. v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)
(posting of plaintiff's name in retail liquor outlets as an excessive drinker to whom
intoxicating beverages should not be sold); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D.
Cal. 1970) (involving confession of judgment); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 109, 488 P.2d 13 (1971) (prohibiting summary attachment of debtor's property
without prior hearing); Mihans v. Municipal Ct., 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1970) (repossession of residence); State ex rel. Payne v. Walden, 190 S.E.2d 770
(W. Va. 1972) (invalidating the West Virginia distress for rent statute). See also
Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va. 1972); Lebowitz v. Forbes
Leasing & Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor
Travel Servs., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970); Larson v. Fetherston, 44
Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969). But see Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424
F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970), where the court limited Sniadach to its facts and refused
to apply it to the enforcement of a security interest, since both parties assented to
the contract, thus constituting a waiver of constitutional rights. The parties assent-
ing to the contract, however, were two companies with equal bargaining power.
Waiver of constitutional rights in such a situation is quite different than in the case
of adhesion contracts, which will be discussed more fully under Section II infra.
8407 U.S. 67 (1972).
'The relevant Florida statutory provisions are FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.10, 78.07,
78.08, 78.10, 78.13 (1964).
[Vol. 76
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for the invalidation of two sections of the Uniform Commercial
Code'" on constitutional grounds. In Adams v. Egley," a United
States district court decided that sections 9-5032 and 9-504 '1 of the
UCC-permitting repossession and disposition of collateral by a
secured party after default by the debtor and authorizing summary
repossession and sale without judicial process-are constitution-
ally defective. Repossession under such sections represents a tak-
ing of property without due process of law. The Adams decision has
been appealed and is now pending before the Ninth Circuit.'4 In
all probability, the case will reach the Supreme Court. A final
determination of the issue is of particular importance to West
Virginia' 5 and every other state which has adopted the UCC.16
The broad scope of the decisions from Sniadach to Fuentes to
Adams reinforces the view that Sniadach was not a special consti-
tutional rule for wages, but rather was an application of the basic
principles of procedural due process to the entire spectrum of pre-
judgment remedies. 7 Thus, absent some compelling state interest,
an individual must be afforded notice and a hearing before he can
be deprived of his life, liberty, or property.
"Hereinafter referred to as UCC.
"338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
"Section 9-503 provides in part that, "[u]nless otherwise agreed a secured
party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral ... [and] may
proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace
'"Section 9-504 permits a secured party to "sell, lease or otherwise dispose of
any or all of the collateral" after giving the debtor and any other person who has a
security interest, notice in writing of the time and place of such disposition. Notice
must be delivered personally or by mailing to the debtor's last known address.
"Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, - F. 2d - (9th Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit
decision was rendered on October 4, 1973, after this note was completed. Reference
to Adams in the text are to the district court decision. For an abstract of the circuit
court's decision, see the Addendum, infra.
",The UCC was enacted into law in West Virginia on July 1, 1964. The sections
identical to the California provisions in question are embodied in W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 46-9-503, 504 (1966).
"'The UCC has been -enacted into law in every state except Louisiana.
"But see Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Reeves
v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Black Watch Farms,
Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); Am. Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman,
317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C.
1970); Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 263 P.2d 68 (1969); Mi-
chael's Jewelers v. Hardy, 6 Conn. Cir. 103, 266 A.2d 904 (1969); Mills v. Bartlett,
265 A.2d 39 (Del. Super. 1970); Realty Co. v. Dep't of Bldgs., 26 N.Y.2d 538, 260
N.E.2d 534, 311 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1970).
4
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II. PRELIMINARY PROBLEMS: JURISDICTION AND WAIVER
Before further developing the application of due process prin-
ciples to prejudgment remedies, it is necessary to examine the
preliminary problems of whether the due process clause has juris-
diction to operate and, if so, whether the debtor has waived his
right to due process. The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment proscribes all state action which denies one his rights
without due process of law. Therefore, it does not shield an individ-
ual from private conduct, no matter how wrongful. 8 The state
action essential to invoke due process guarantees can occur only
where the state, has acted through its governmental authorities"0
and is involved to a significant extent." The question of what
constitutes significant state involvement has not been clearly de-
fined by the courts and is left to be determined "by sifting facts
and weighing circumstances. '" 21
Private agreements, standing alone, seem not to violate due
process as long as they are effectuated by voluntary adherence to
their terms. However, the district court, in Adams, rejected this
argument where repossession, although obstensibly a private act
pursuant to the terms of a contract, was in accordance with proce-
dures embodied in statutory law. The Adams court felt that inclu-
sion in the contract of a specific reference to a statute or a provision
for repossession "according to law"' indicated discrimination in-
duced by statute and authorized under color of state law. The mere
enactment of the statute constituted sufficient state action to
bring the acts of the creditor within the purview of the fourteenth
amendment.2 This theory is apparently based on the proposition
that as long as state statutes provide a basis of authority for repos-
session by a private individual and such repossession is executed,
state action is present .2
"Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948).
"Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
"Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
21365 U.S. at 722.
"Posadas v. Star and Crescent Federal Credit Union, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.
Cal. 1972), was consolidated with Adams because of their similarity. Posadas bor-
rowed $1300 for the purchase of a truck and executed a promissory note and security
agreement with the truck as security. The contract provided for "immediate posses-
sion of said . . . property according to law" in case of default. Posadas defaulted
and the Credit Union took the truck.
2lAccord, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1957).
2'Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
[Vol. 76
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If an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to
act under that authority, his action is state action. It is irrele-
vant that he might have taken the same action had he acted in
a purely private capacity of that the particular action which he
took was not authorized by state law.n
Thus, the incorporation of statutory repossession and resale proce-
dures, particularly from the UCC, into commercial contracts,
seems to constitute the significant state involvement necessary to
invoke the due process clause.
The question of whether a repossession is permissible self-help
or a prohibited denial of due process is complex. If a repossession
is merely a mechanism of self-help, there is no state involvement
and, hence, no denial of procedural due process regardless of how
capricious the repossession may be. However, if self-help is pro-
vided by a state statute, although the effect is to encourage extra-
judicial repossession, the roots of such repossession are firmly im-
planted in the common law which the statutes have merely codi-
fied. But the common law roots of a procedure do not necessarily
preclude it from being held unconstitutional.2 6 Although a creditor
is not compelled by a statute to use prejudgment seizure, the stat-
ute is the ultimate source of the right of such seizure; therefore,
state action is arguably present.
Once the problem of jurisdiction is overcome by the establish-
ment of significant state action, the operation of the due process
clause may yet be avoided if the debtor waives his constitutional
rights of notice and hearing prior to being divested of his property.
Several courts have held that a debtor waives his constitutional
rights to notice and hearing by entering into an agreement, such
as a conditional sales contract, which places him on notice of the
consequences of default. 27 This precise defense arose in both
Fuentes and Adams.
The presumption against such waiver, however, is a well-
'Id. at 135.
"For example, the landlord's distress procedure that was held unconstitutional
in State ex rel. Payne v. Walden, 190 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1972), had its origin in
feudal times. Jones v. Ford, 254 F. 645 (8th Cir. 1918). Also, the improver's lien
held unconstitutional in Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.
W. Va. 1973), was classified a common law lien. Stallard v. Stepp, 91 W. Va. 60,
112 S.E. 184 (1922).
"D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971); Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964);
Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
6
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settled point of law.2 The party alleging waiver must show "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege. 29 The Supreme Court, in a case involving a prior confes-
sion of judgment," recently held that a contractual waiver of con-
stitutional rights is effective where it is voluntarily, intelligently,
and knowingly made pursuant to negotiations between two compa-
nies with equal bargaining power. However, in the case of adhesion
contracts, where the terms are specified by the seller or lender on
a "take it or leave it basis," any purported waiver of fundamental
rights can hardly be said to be "voluntarily" made.
Although it is likely that individuals who sign installment
sales contracts are aware of the possibility that their default will
result in prejudgment seizure without notice and hearing, it is
unlikely that these individuals recognize that they are waiving
constitutional rights. In order for merchants, finance companies,
and various other creditors to invoke the concept of waiver it seems
necessary that they redefine "repossession" in the contract, mak-
ing it clear to the prospective debtor that his signature will surren-
der his constitutional rights. This requirement parallels those im-
posed by Miranda v. Arizona"' on an arresting officer. Even if such
requirements are fulfilled, a prior hearing to determine the validity
of the waiver probably remains essential.
IH. THE EFFECTS OF DUE PROCESS APPLICATION ON WEST VIRGINIA
PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES
Judicial dissatisfaction with summary prejudgment remedies
seriously challenges the validity of numerous analagous summary
procedures. The effect of Sniadach and its progeny has already
been felt in West Virginia. In State ex rel Payne v. Walden,32 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declared the West Vir-
ginia distress for rent statutes3-which permitted property of a
tenant to be levied upon and seized without prior notice or oppor-
2Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389
(1937); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n. 301 U.S. 292 (1937); Swarb v.
Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
2Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
"D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
31384 U.S. 436 (1966). Under Miranda, a person in custody must be informed
that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used
against him in court, that he has a right to have counsel present at the interroga-
tion, and that if he cannot afford counsel, one will be appointed for him.
32190 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1972). See also 74 W. Va. L. Rev. 170 (1971).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37-6-9, 12, 14 (1966).
[Vol. 76
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tunity for a hearing-unconstitutional as repugnant to the due
process clause. Judge Haden stressed that:
When one is deprived of a right, it matters not that the depriva-
tion is minimal. A restriction of a property right, temporarily
or permanently, is nevertheless a prohibited curtailment of a
right protected by the Constitution when such is accomplished
without notice or hearing, absent a showing of a special or ex-
traordinary state or creditor interest.Y
The Payne decision may likewise render the West Virginia
garnishment statute35 unconstitutional. Under this statute the
plaintiff-creditor in an attachment action may designate any per-
son as being indebted or liable to the defendant-debtor or having
in his possession the effects of the defendant. Mere service of the
order of attachment upon such person gives the plaintiff a lien on
the claim or right which the defendant has against the garnishee.
This procedure was deemed not violative of due process in Byrd v.
Rector.3 The court, in Byrd, reasoned that where a writ of attach-
ment is issued prior to a judicial determination of the rights of the
parties, there is no denial of due process, since there has been no
final determination of these rights and, hence, no deprivation of
property. The court, in Payne, specifically overruled Byrd to the
extent that it held the deprivation of a tenant's property via dis-
tress for rent a mere "temporary inconvenience" and not a denial
of due process. The similar reasoning, in Byrd, that garnishment
in aid of attachment does not deny due process since there is no
final determination of the rights of the parties, is defective since
it is, nonetheless, a temporary curtailment of the debtor's rights
without judicial process as forbidden by Payne.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia adopted the theories of Sniadach and Fuentes in
Shaffer v. Holbrook,37 which reached the same conclusion as Payne
and held the West Virginia distress for rent procedure violative of
procedural due process. The court recently expanded this view in
Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co. Inc.,3 when it declared the West
Virginia repairman's lien 39 unconstitutional. However, the court
11190 S.E.2d at 779.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-7-15 (1966).
11W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932).
31346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. W. Va. 1972).
"359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. W. Va. 1973).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-3 (1966). The improver's, storer's or transporter's
lien will hereinafter be referred to as the repairman's lien.
8
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ruled the statute void "in the context of and as applied in [that]
action,"' therefore hinting that the case may be restricted to its
facts.'
The principles of Sniadach have also provided the foundation
for the requirement of an evidentiary hearing based on timely and
adequate notice before a welfare recipient's assistance can be ter-
minated.2 Likewise, these same principles have been applied to
invalidate 'automatic suspension of a driver's license pursuant to
a state's "point system."43
In all probability, West Virginia will experience further exten-
sions of procedural due process to prejudgment remedies. The Flor-
ida replevin statutes struck down in Fuentes are very similar to the
West Virginia detinue scheme, 4 which also encompasses prejudg-
ment seizure without notice or hearing. The Fuentes decision will
probably be the basis for invalidating the West Virginia statutes
or the impetus for grafting onto the statutes a mechanism for no-
tice and hearing to satisfy due process requirements.
The West Virginia innkeeper's lien45 and bailee's lien4 have
the same enforcement procedure as that of the repairman's lien
which was held unconstitutional in Straley. From Straley, only a
4359 F. Supp. at 906.
"In Straley the defendant estimated the cost of repair work to the plaintiff's
auto as being between sixty and seventy dollars. After making the repairs, however,
the charges totaled some $230 which was more than the vehicle, valued at $150, was
worth and more than the plaintiff was able to pay. The defendant refused to surren-
der possession of the auto until the bill was paid. The plaintiff was unable to regain
possession through a justice of the peace proceeding without employing an attorney
and posting bond in an amount double the mechanic's bill. Under the West Virginia
statute, the repairman, storer, or transporter already has a lien on personal property
in his possession. He is not required to make an affidavit, post bond, or institute
an action. He has the authority to give written notice to the debtor, to advertise,
and to sell the property at an auction. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-14 (1966). The
court felt, a fortiori, that the West Virginia repairman's lien enforcement proce-
dures fail to fulfill the requirements of due process more grievously than the land-
lord's distress procedures invalidated by Payne and Shaffer.
12Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
13Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). Under W. VA. COD ANN. § 17B-3-6
(1966), the only hearing afforded a driver on his license suspension comes after it
has been suspended. Thus, the West Virginia system is in grave danger of being
declared unconstitutional under recent case law.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-6-1 to 7 (1966).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-5 (1966). Under this statute an innkeeper may
retain possession of personal property for the amount of his lawful claim for lodging.
46W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-4 (1966).
(Vol. 76
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short step is required to find these two statutory liens unconstitu-
tional. Even if Straley is limited to its facts, the requirement that
the lienholder be given possession of the property in question and
comply with certain statutory requirements 7 before the lien is cre-
ated is not enough to satisfy due process. Under Fuentes a hearing
is still required as long as the continued possession is disputed. The
lienholder must at least show that the debtor has defaulted.
The holder in due course doctrine48 may also be affected by the
application of due process. Under the doctrine, if a negotiable
instrument is obtained in the ordinary course of business by a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice of any defense to the note,49
the holder can enforce the obligation irrespective of such defense.A0
A holder in due course has a distinct advantage in consumer credit
transactions. If a debtor signs an installment note to pay a seller
for the purchase of goods and the seller negotiates the note to a
bank, the bank usually has the status of a holder in due course.
As a holder in due course, the bank can enforce the buyer's obliga-
tion to pay on the note even if the buyer has a defense which would
excuse his failure to pay the seller, i.e., the merchandise is defec-
tive or was never delivered. If the buyer denies his obligation to
pay, a parallel can be drawn to Fuentes which requires notice and
a hearing where possession of property is disputed. Fuentes, then,
may require that the buyer receive notice of the assignment or the
sale of his obligation and be afforded an opportunity to be heard
on any defenses to it before he is required to pay.
On the other hand, attachment liens5' may not fall victim to
the requirements of procedural due process. Although by its very
nature a prejudgment remedy, an attachment lien is an extraordi-
nary remedy and cannot attach unless specific statutory grounds
TThese statutory requirements, which are set forth in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-
11-14 (1966), are that the lien be satisfied as agreed between the parties or if no
such agreement, by giving the debtor written notice containing a statement of the
lienor's claim, the sum due and the date it became due. The notice shall also
include a description of the goods aliened, a demand that the amount due be paid
within a specified time, and a statement that if not paid within such time it will
be advertised and sold by auction at a specified time and place.
4Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep 398 (K.B. 1758), is the basis for the holder in due
course doctrine. It held that a promissory bearer note exchanged as money by
businessmen in the ordinary course of business is the same as "cash."
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-3-302 (1966).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-3-305 (1966).
"W. VA. CODE ANN §§ 38-7-1 to 46 (1966).
10
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exist. 52 This distinguishing feature may qualify the attachment
lien as a statute narrowly drawn to meet an extraordinary situation
and, accordingly, constitutional under Sniadach.
If the district court's decision in Adams is upheld, it would
appear to be only a matter of time before the identical provisions
respecting secured transactions in West Virginia and every other
UCC jurisdiction are likewise held unconstitutional. However, af-
firmation of the district court's decision is not a certainty. The
problem of whether there is sufficient state action to establish
jurisdiction,5 is critical in the Adams case. Unlike Fuentes, which
involved repossession of property by state officers pursuant to state
statutes, Adams involves self-help repossession by a secured party
pursuant to rights granted under a security agreement. 4 Although
these rights may arguably be sanctioned under state law, the se-
cured party is not compelled to exercise them. If he chooses to
exercise them, he is limited to self-help repossession that can be
accomplished without a breach of the peace.5 The crucial issue is
whether state action is present in the mere enactment of statutes
clothing private individuals with the essentials of police power in
exercising repossession or whether self-help repossession pursuant
to a security agreement is outside the purview of the fourteenth
amendment.
The appellee's brief to the Ninth Circuit 6 argues that the
sections of the UCC in question, 7 which permit summary reposses-
sion by a secured party, operate more harshly than the replevin
5
'The statutory grounds prescribed by W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-7-2 (1966), exist
where the debtor is a foreign corporation, or a non-resident of the State, or where
the debtor is about to leave the State with intent to defraud his creditors, or is about
to convert his property so as to defeat his creditors, or where any of several similar
grounds are present.
5For a discussion of the requisite state action to establish jurisdiction, see text
accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
5
'The security agreement in Adams provides that upon the occurrence of de-
fault the secured is entitled to take possession of the vehicle and take such other
measures as may be necessary to protect the vehicle. 338 F. Supp. at 616 (S.D. Cal.
1972).
51UCC § 9-503.
sThe author wishes to express his gratitude to the Honorable John T. Copen-
haver, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, for his aid in procuring the briefs to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in the appeal of Adams v. Egley, which is styled Adams v. S. Cal.
First Nat'l Bank. These briefs will hereinafter be referred to as briefs for appellant
or appellee.
57UCC §§ 9-503, 9-504.
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procedures of Pennsylvania and Florida which were struck down
in Fuentes. The appellee argues that these sections deny the debtor
both a pre-seizure and a post-seizure hearing before he is perma-
nently deprived of his property. The secured creditor unilaterally
determines if default has occurred and recovers the property with-
out the assistance of regular law enforcement officers. No bond is
required of the secured party prior to seizure, and the debtor can-
not regain possession by posting a counter-bond. Applying the rule
of Fuentes, that a creditor must show, at least, default by the
debtor prior to seizing property, it is inevitable that Adams will be
affirmed if sufficient state action is found to invoke the due process
clause.
In the opposing brief filed by the Southern California First
National Bank, the appellants argue that if state action is deemed
to exist in Adams, the creditor has a similar cause of action against
a debtor for denial of due process. This is based on the theory that
the debtor's unilateral failure to make payments has deprived the
creditor of a significant property interest-the possession of and
right to use the money owed-without notice or hearing. Basic to
this argument is the appellant creditor's concern that the applica-
tion of due process to the debtor-creditor relationship would en-
hance the debtor's opportunity to abscond. Through the use of in-
junctions"' and temporary restraining orders, however, a creditor
can enjoin a debtor's use of specific property prior to obtaining a
judgment and thereby protect his interest in the property from
fraudulent sale, removal or concealment by the debtor.
The appellants further argue that if sections 9-503 and 9-504
are rendered void, all states except Louisiana would be left without
statutes governing the rights of parties in secured transactions
after default. The need for such legislation would invariably lead
individual states to enact repossession statutes with whatever pro-
cedural safeguards each feels necessary, thus losing the element of
uniformity which the UCC fosters.
The effects of Adams and similar cases will be much greater
than the mere destruction of part of the UCC's uniformity. As
recited by the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC in its amicus
curiae brief in Adams, "[Tlhe aim or goal of any system which is
adopted to regulate realization on security interests after default
can be stated simply-disposition of the collateral at a fair price
"W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-5-1 to 13 (1966).
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with the least possible delay and at the lowest possible cost."" The
economic consequences of the application of procedural due pro-
cess to prejudgment remedies will hinder this aim. Undoubtedly,
the requirement of a prior hearing will further congest our already
crowded courts. In addition, the cost of such hearings will probably
find its way back to the pockets of the consumer, either through
higher interest rates or increased taxes. Creditors will be more
selective in extending credit, presumably resulting in less buying
by the consumer.
IV. MEETING THE TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The imposition of notice and hearing requirements by
Sniadach, Fuentes, and subsequent holdings leaves many unan-
swered questions as to what means are available to protect the
interests of the creditor without infringing upon the debtor's con-
stitutional rights. If these requirements are to fulfill their purpose,
then, clearly, notice must be given and a hearing granted in time
to prevent the deprivation of property. Even though a post-seizure
hearing can result in the return of an individual's property and an
award of damages if it was unfairly taken from him, it cannot undo
the fact that an arbitrary taking contrary to procedural due process
guarantees has already occurred. The Court in Fuentes repudiated
"the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be
undone." 0
The Commercial Law League of America' is presently consid-
ering a "Model Notice and Hearing for Provisional Remedies Act"
drafted by Professor William D. Hawkland of the University of
Illinois which would meet the due process requirements imposed
by Sniadach and Fuentes and still protect the creditor's rights.
The act uses the term "provisional legal or equitable process"62 to
define all remedies prior to final judgment that enable a creditor
to restrain the debtor's use or disposition of any property in which
the debtor claims an interest, or to restrain the person of the
"'Brief for Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code as
Amicus Curiae at 1, Adams v. S. Cal. First Nat'l Bank, - F.2d - (9th Cir.
1973).
6407 U.S. at 82.
"The Commercial Law League of America, founded in 1895, publishes the
monthly Commercial Law Journal. The League's membership includes commercial
and credit agency representatives, lawyers, and law list publishers.
'
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debtor.63 The issuance of such process to any creditor not holding
a court order is prohibited. 4 This provision is based on the princi-
ples of Sniadach and Fuentes and blocks the creditor from seizing
or arresting the debtor or repossessing his property without a court
order. The court order will normally be granted only after a hearing
to determine the probable validity of the creditor's claim."
To obtain an order authorizing the issuance of "provisional
legal or equitable process," the creditor must file an affidavit with
the court.66 The affidavit must contain, inter alia, a description of
the claimed property, a statement as to the source of the creditor's
interest in the property and his right to possession, a statement
that it is being wrongfully detained, a statement of the means by
which the debtor or third party came into possession, and the
cause of the wrongful detention.6 7 Pursuant to this affidavit, the
court issues an order directed to the debtor to show cause why the
claimed property should not be taken from the possession of the
debtor or third party and delivered to the creditor.6 This show
cause order implements the rights announced by Sniadach and
Fuentes; it notifies the debtor of his opportunity to be heard on the
probable validity of the creditor's claim by fixing the date and time
of the hearing. This date shall not be "sooner than 7 days nor more
than 14 days after the service of the order." 9 The debtor is thereby
afforded reasonable notice of the hearing, yet his opportunity to
abscond is minimized.
The order must be personally served on the debtor whenever
possible. Otherwise, service must be in a manner that, in the opin-
ion of the court, is reasonably calculated to afford the debtor no-
tice. 0 In addition to notice of the hearing, the order also notifies
the debtor of his right to respond to the creditor's claim, sets a
reasonable period for such a response, and informs the debtor of
the probable consequences of his failure to respond.' The debtor
also is given the right to stay the order by posting bond.72 This
"For a further discussion of this concept, see note 1 supra.
11W. Hawkland, Model Notice and Hearing for Provisional Remedies Act § 2a
(unpublished).






"Id. Comments to § 4, para. 2.
"Id. § 4b(4).
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provides relative equality with the creditor who can take the
debtor's property prior to judgment by posting bond in accordance
with applicable West Virginia statutes.
Under Professor Hawkland's Act, a hearing is conducted on
the show cause order by the court sitting without a jury." The
court determines whether it is necessary to restrain the debtor in
order to protect the creditor's interest and which of the parties,
with reasonable probability, is entitled to the possession of the
property pending a final judgment.7 4 If the court rules that the
creditor's claim is probably valid then it issues the creditor an
order authorizing him to employ "provisional legal or equitable
process.
75
Obviously, the preliminary hearing required by recent case
law and proposed by Professor Hawkland is not a final determina-
tion of the parties' rights. It is used to determine if the creditor is
probably entitled to relief, not whether in fact he will prevail. To
avoid abuse of the notice and hearing requirement, it is necessary
that a neutral judicial officer, as distinguished from an administra-
tive officer, preside over the hearing. It is essential that the officer
act in a judicial rather than an administrative capacity." The
officer will have to preside over an adversary preliminary hearing
between debtor and creditor and make a rational determination of
who is likely to prevail. To merely bring the parties before the court
and summarily issue an order authorizing "provisional legal or
equitable process" would be an administrative act and would not
fulfill the requirements of due process.
The Act also provides for summary procedures that the credi-
tor can employ in extraordinary situations which are deemed con-
stitutional under Sniadach and Fuentes. If the creditor files an
affidavit which reasonably tends to show that the debtor or third
party in possession of the disputed property is engaged in conduct,
or is about to engage in conduct, to conceal the debtor or remove
-him from the court's jurisdiction or to place the disputed property
in danger of destruction, concealment, etc., the court may issue a




761n Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. W. Va. 1972), a West Virginia
justice of the peace issued a distress for rent warrant; the district court held that
he was performing a non-judicial act.
77W. Hawkland, Model Notice and Hearing for Provisional Remedies Act, § 6
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The Model Act recognizes that a debtor may waive his rights
to notice and a hearing, but only if the waiver is made voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly.78 These standards are deemed not to
have been met if the waiver occurs at any time prior to the service
of the show cause order, providing the debtor is not a merchant. 9
The debtor, therefore, cannot waive his rights at the time the
debtor-creditor relationship arises or prior to the occurrence of the
debtor's alleged default. If the debtor is a merchant, however, he
can waive his right to notice and a hearing prior to service of the
show cause order by a statement in writing conspicuously showing
the waiver to be made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly."
These provisions of the Act recognize the distinctions made in
Fuentes between waiver by a merchant and a non-merchant
debtor. Waiver by a non-merchant debtor prior to default is essen-
tially a contract of adhesion where the creditor has all of the bar-
gaining power. The debtor either waives his rights to notice and
hearing or is not extended credit. Under Professor Hawkland's
scheme, the waiver of constitutional rights by adhesion contracts
is rendered ineffective. This prevents the possibility of the creditor
obtaining a waiver by bombarding the debtor with papers to sign
at the time credit is extended. The ultimate test of the effective-
ness of a waiver under the Model Act is whether the debtor has
made such waiver voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly.
Professor Hawkland's Act does leave one glaring question un-
answered; it does not include self-help within its scope, 1 but oper-
ates only in cases where there is "state action." The Act notes that
the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether there is state
action involved in the use of self-help,82 a question which may well
be answered by Adams. If the Supreme Court determines that self-
help is subject to procedural due process requirements, Hawk-
land's scheme could easily be adapted to such a decision by ex-
panding the definition of "provisional legal or equitable process."
The distinction between self-help and repossession with the
aid of state officers seems destined to become meaningless consid-
ering the expansion of the principles of Sniadach and legislation







"2Id. Comments to § 2, para. 3.
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Consumer Finance in a recent report entitled "Consumer Credit in
the United States" abandoned the distinction in applying proce-
dural due process guarantees to prejudgment remedies. If the dis-
tinction is abolished by Adams, legislatures will have to adopt a
scheme for notice and hearing prior to repossession. Professor
Hawkland's Act should be given prime consideration.
V. CONCLUSION
The application of procedural due process guarantees to pre-
judgment remedies has placed all such remedies in danger of being
declared unconstitutional. Prejudgment seizure without notice
and hearing is prohibited except in extraordinary circumstances
where a statute is narrowly drawn to meet a particular situation.
However, a condition precedent to application of due process is
that there has been some significant state action involved in deny-
ing the rights of notice and a hearing prior to repossession, and the
debtor has not waived these rights. The core of the problem, then,
is twofold: (1) the determination of what constitutes a narrowly
drawn statute that is constitutional without notice and hearing in
extraordinary situations; and (2) the determination of what consti-
tutes significant state action.
The question of whether a statute is narrowly drawn to meet
an extraordinary situation can only be answered on a case by case
basis. Several rules of thumb, however, are present. If a debtor is
engaging in, or is about to engage in, conduct which will considera-
bly lessen the creditor's chances of collection-such as concealing
either himself or the property in question from the jurisdiction of
the court or committing any other act fraudulent to the credi-
tor-an extraordinary situation exists. Therefore, a creditor can
temporarily restrain the debtor if a statute specifically enumerates
such extraordinary situations and is narrowly drawn to meet them.
The problem of what constitutes state action is more complex.
It is elementary that state action exists when prejudgment repos-
session is accomplished by the use of state officers (sheriff, con-
stable, marshall, etc.). However, it is not clear if state action exists
in cases where repossession is without the aid of state officers, and
the creditor is merely exercising self-help. Self-help is a limited
remedy since it can only be exercised if done so peacefully. Thus,
'
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a debtor's refusal to permit the creditor to repossess precludes its
exercise. A final determination of whether self-help is permissible
under the due process clause should be forthcoming if Adams v.
Egley8" reaches the United States Supreme Court.
The effects of denying the creditor's prejudgment remedies
will be widely felt by the general public. Significant portions of
every state's statutes will be invalidated for non-compliance with
the debtor's rights of procedural due process, and the cost of this
compliance will probably be absorbed by the consumer.
Regardless of the consequences, summary procedures are tee-
tering on the edge of unconstitutionality. Recent judicial dissatis-
faction with these statutory prejudgment remedies is merely an-
other example of strict adherence to basic constitutional principles
of fundamental fairness. West Virginia's garnishment statute, 85
detinue scheme," holder in due course doctrine, 7 and motor vehi-
cle point system, 8 along with the possessory liens of repairmen,9
bailees,"0 and innkeepers,8" and statutes regarding a secured party's
right to possession" and disposition" of collateral after default may
soon be held unconstitutional. "For when a person has an oppor-
tunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the State must
listen to what he has to say, substantively unfair and simply mis-
taken deprivations of property interests can be prevented." 4
"338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-7-15 (1966).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-6-1 to 7 (1966).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-3-305 (1966).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17B-3-6 (1966).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-3 (1966).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-4 (1966).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-5 (1966).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-503 (1966).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-504 (1966).
"Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
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ADDENDUM: ADAMS V. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRST
NATIONAL BANK
The Constitutionality of Self-Help Repossession
Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, - F.2d
(9th Cir. 1973). The appellee, Adams, borrowed money from
the appellant bank and executed a promissory note and security
agreement covering his automobiles. The security agreement gave
the bank the rights and remedies of a secured party under sections
9-5031 and 9-5042 of the UCC, which permit summary repossession
and sale without judicial process upon default by the debtor. After
paying nearly $900 on a $1,100 loan, Adams defaulted, and the
bank took possession of the vehicles and sold them at a private
sale. Adams brought suit in federal district court, alleging that the
repossession by the bank was under color of state law and, hence,
a denial of his constitutional right to due process of law. The dis-
trict court upheld the petitioner's contention that sections 9-503
and 9-504 of the UCC set forth a state policy constituting sufficient
state action to justify a conclusion that the repossession by the
bank was a denial of the petitioner's constitutional right to due
process and that the sections facilitating such repossession were
unconstitutional.3
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court
in an opinion filed on October 4, 1973. The court held that the state
was not significantly involved in the self-help repossession proce-
dures undertaken by the bank to permit the finding of state action
required to establish the debtor's cause of action.' The court
viewed the bank's conduct as action taken by a private creditor
without any direct action by the state. The fact that the bank
acted with knowledge of, and pursuant to, state law was held not
to constitute sufficient state involvement to invoke the proscrip-
tions of the fourteenth amendment. The majority opinion rejected
'Section 9-503 provides in part that "[unless otherwise agreed a secured party
has on default the right to take possession of the collateral . . . [and] may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace ... "
'Section 9-504 permits a secured party to "sell, lease or otherwise dispose of
any or all of the collateral after giving the debtor and any other person who has a
security interest notice in writing of the time and place of such disposition." Notice
must be delivered personally or by mailing to the debtor's last known address.
3Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
'The test is not mere state involvement, but significant state involvement.
Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
[Vol. 76
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the appellee's reliance on Reitman v. Mulkey5 as standing for the
proposition that when a state's statutes provide authority for re-
possession by a private individual and such repossession is as-
serted, state action is present. Reitman was distinguished because
the state, by approving a proposition reversing previously existing
law, was involved to a much greater degree than in Adams,' where
sections 9-503 and 9-504 merely codified existing law. Further, in
Reitman, the state's "subjective intent" was to indirectly circum-
vent individual constitutional rights by encouraging racial dis-
crimination in housing, while the creditor's remedies in question
in Adams were based on extensively researched economic grounds
of long standing. The court was not convinced that the resolution
of a state action question involving prejudgment self-help reposses-
sion of secured property should be controlled by a case involving
racial discrimination.7 The court, however, found Reitman quite
relevant for what the Supreme Court stated it did not hold; that
is, it did not forbid a state from putting into statutory form "an
existing policy of neutrality with respect to private discrimina-
tion."'
The dissenting opinion felt that the majority's distinguishing
of Reitman by its facts was unsupportable and that Reitman was
applicable to the Adams situation. The state deliberately chose a
policy encouraging the repossession and sale of collateral without
judicial process by embodying it in sections 9-503 and 9-504. The
state meaningfully encouraged the bank, which admittedly acted
pursuant to the statute, and, thus, the state was significantly in-
volved within the meaning of Reitman.
The decision of the Ninth Circuit in this case is very important
in the determination of what constitutes significant state action to
invoke the purview of due process. Although the decision con-
cluded that self-help is not within the realm of due process for want
of significant state action, it may not be the last word on the issue.
5387 U.S. 369 (1967).
'In Reitman, the California legislature had enacted several statutes regulating
racial discrimination in housing. In 1964, a proposition was added to the State
constitution to provide that the State could not place any limitation on the right
of a person to deal with his own real property.
7Since the state action question was to be decided by "balancing facts and
weighing circumstances," a consideration of substantive facts was required. Such
consideration "should not result in a heirarchy of rights. . . but . . . should permit
independent factual determination of state action on a case-by-case approach."
1387 U.S. at 376.
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It is quite probable that the decision will be appealed to the Su-
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